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CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
OF GOVERNANCE PERTAINING TO THE FAITH-BASED 
AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVE 
Ira C. Lupu 
Robert W. Tuttle 
Thirty years ago, a governmental initiative designed to encourage the participation of houses of 
worship in government-financed social services would have been unthinkable. At that time, 
many faith-based social welfare providers received public funding, but those providers were 
generally large, highly secularized entities (Monsma, 1996; Saperstein, 2003). For years, 
prominent religious denominations had chosen to deliver social services through separately 
incorporated and specialized entities, such as Catholic Charities and Lutheran Social Services. 
This service delivery structure permitted social service professionals to carry out their functions 
without day-to-day oversight by religious leaders. The structure also insulated houses of worship 
from the responsibilities and potential liabilities associated with the delivery of social services.  
As a constitutional matter, the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, which provides that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion,” stood as an impediment 
to government financing of houses of worship and other institutions that engaged in religious 
instruction. The Supreme Court had interpreted the Clause to prohibit government funds from 
flowing directly to “pervasively sectarian” entities (Hunt v. McNair, 1973), a category that 
encompassed houses of worship, religious elementary and secondary schools, and colleges with a 
strong religious identity. 
Between 1988 and 2000, however, the relevant constitutional law shifted, and policies on public 
aid to faith-based service providers began to follow suit. In Bowen v. Kendrick (1988), the 
Supreme Court upheld legislation that explicitly allowed religious organizations to receive 
funding as service providers for a program aimed at adolescent sexuality. Following the Bowen 
decision, courts started to relax the constitutional restrictions governing expenditures to religious 
entities. Themes of equal access to public resources by religious actors began to emerge in the 
legal and political culture, as exemplified by the Charitable Choice provisions of the welfare 
reform legislation, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996. These provisions include (1) a mandate on participating states to treat religious entities on 
the same basis as secular service providers, (2) a promise that participating religious 
organizations can retain their religious character and identity, (3) a requirement that all providers 
respect the religious liberty of beneficiaries, (4) a prohibition on direct government funding of 
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“sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization,” and (5) an affirmation that participating 
religious organizations retain their right to make religion-based employment decisions.  
When George W. Bush began his presidency, the legal ban on grants to pervasively sectarian 
entities had been effectively eliminated (Mitchell v. Helms, 2000). The Supreme Court’s decision 
in the Cleveland school voucher case (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002), which upheld against 
constitutional challenge a program of voucher-based financial support for education in private 
schools (some with a strong religious identity), paved the way for greater latitude in the 
involvement of faith-based organizations in government-financed programs. Nevertheless, 
important constitutional restrictions on government support for religious activity remain in 
effect.  
Immediately on taking office in January 2001, President Bush issued executive orders that set in 
motion the Faith-Based and Community Initiative (FBCI) (Exec. Orders 13,198–13,199). These 
orders created the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (WHOFBCI) 
and established centers for this initiative in the most prominent grant-making agencies in the 
federal government. The President ordered the agency centers to find and eliminate unnecessary 
obstacles to the participation of faith-based and community organizations in government-
financed social services. In 2003 and thereafter, these agencies promulgated a series of 
regulations designed to eliminate such impediments and ensure the equal treatment of religious 
organizations seeking to partner with federal or state agencies in the delivery of social services. 
For example, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued a regulation 
focused on the equal treatment of religious organizations that participate in the agency’s funding 
programs, and many federal agencies have similar regulations (for additional examples, see the 
Table of Legal Materials in Appendix A).  
From the beginning of this effort, however, the FBCI has faced the formidable task of translating 
a set of emerging constitutional principles into workable regulatory concepts. This initiative rests 
on a premise of neutrality or nondiscrimination between secular and religious providers; in other 
words, faith-based providers are equal to secular service providers in eligibility to participate in 
the delivery of government-financed services. But the relevant constitutional law still embodies 
remnants of a premise in tension with complete neutrality; namely, religious activities are 
constitutionally different from secular activities, even if both are undertaken for the same public 
purposes. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment continues to impose constraints on 
public financing of religious activity, and many state constitutions have similar limitations.  
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The existing literature on the legal parameters surrounding the FBCI has tended to take one of 
two forms. Much of the literature emphasizes the social, religious, cultural, political, and 
administrative milieus in which this initiative developed, and does not delve deeply into legal 
considerations (Monsma, 1996; Farris, Nathan, & Wright, 2004; Ryden & Polet, 2005; DiIulio, 
2007). More traditional legal literature either defends the FBCI’s basic premise of “the level 
playing field” (Esbeck, 1997) or is critical of the initiative for being insensitive to traditional 
concerns of church-state separation (Saperstein, 2003; Gilman, 2002, 2007a).  
However, a more comprehensive approach to legal analysis of the FBCI focuses on the rate and 
direction of legal change in the relevant constitutional norms, the details of the implementation 
to the Initiative and the constitutional constraints that surround the FBCI, and the litigation 
associated with this Initiative (Lupu & Tuttle, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2007). 
This paper addresses the regulatory response of various government agencies to the relationship 
between the FBCI’s agenda and the changing legal environment. After briefly mapping the key 
developmental points in the relevant constitutional law, the discussion focuses on the particulars 
of regulatory language as put into place by the agencies of the U.S. government and considers 
the litigation efforts that have occurred in conjunction with this initiative. Some of the litigation 
may be traced, at least in part, to inadequacies in the FBCI’s regulatory reform. In addition, the 
paper provides recommendations for federal and state regulatory language that could be used to 
facilitate the FBCI while keeping it within constitutional bounds. The paper does not 
systematically evaluate the less formal documents and processes on which the federal 
government frequently relies to guide grant recipients. 
THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
The regulatory reforms and the litigation challenges prompted by the FBCI can best be 
understood in light of the evolving principles of First Amendment law. For over six decades, the 
Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to 
impose some constraints on public financing of religious entities (Everson v. Board of Ewing 
Township, 1947). Although the interpretive details have changed, the Court’s guiding principle 
throughout has been that the government may not promote or directly subsidize religious 
worship or instruction in a particular faith. When the government engages in or directly supports 
religious indoctrination, it violates the core understanding of the First Amendment ban on 
“establishment of religion.” This prohibition, called the “no-indoctrination” principle, is 
absolute. Unlike other values protected by the First Amendment, the ban on religious 
establishment is never balanced against the social benefits that would arise from a violation of 
the principle. Many state constitutions have similar limitations (Lupu & Tuttle, 2002). 
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From the early 1970s until the late 1990s, the Supreme Court implemented that principle with a 
sharply defined rule that government could not make direct grants to “pervasively sectarian” 
entities, such as houses of worship, religious schools, and even social welfare organizations that 
had an overtly religious character. The Court reasoned that grants to such organizations would 
inevitably support the mission of religious indoctrination because the government was incapable 
of ensuring that the organization would use public funds solely for secular activities. 
Between 1981 and 2002, however, three new and highly relevant constitutional principles 
emerged. The first principle involves the Court’s gradual abandonment of the overly broad rule 
that pervasively sectarian entities may not participate in social welfare programs and replacement 
of that rule with a narrower no-indoctrination rule that the government may not directly finance 
religious activities (Agostini v. Felton, 1997; Mitchell v. Helms, 2000). At the heart of this shift 
is the Court’s determination that faith-based entities will not inevitably divert public resources to 
serve their religious mission, but instead may be trusted to comply with restrictions on how 
public aid may be used. Such trust is conditional; the Court ruled in Mitchell that aid to religious 
entities must incorporate adequate safeguards, including monitoring, against the diversion of 
public funds to religious use. 
The second principle concerns “beneficiary choice.” When the funding program is structured to 
permit beneficiaries a genuine and independent choice among secular and religious providers, 
and public funds are directed to the provider only as a result of such choices by beneficiaries, 
religious organizations may use these funds for religious indoctrination as an element of the 
relevant service (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002). For example, school voucher programs may 
permit participating schools to include prayer or religious instruction as an element of the 
education of voucher students, so long as students and their families have a genuine choice 
among religious and secular schools and schools only receive funds as a result of the exercise of 
such a choice. This financing structure is typically labeled indirect funding because of the role of 
the beneficiary as an intermediary in distribution of public funds to religious entities. Programs 
that fall under the principle of beneficiary choice thus are outside the scope of the no-
indoctrination principle because the beneficiary, rather than the government, is responsible for 
any religious indoctrination that occurs within the funded program.  
The third principle involves contexts in which the government is providing a forum for speech 
rather than grants for the performance of services; in such situations the Court began to 
recognize claims of nondiscrimination, or equal access, by religious persons or causes (Widmar 
v. Vincent, 1981; Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 1993; 
Rosenberger v. Univ. of Virginia, 1995; Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 2001). 
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Supporters of the FBCI embrace this principle of equal access and argue that it should be 
extended to public grants and other forms of financial support. In Locke v. Davey (2004), 
however, the Court ruled that, even in a beneficiary choice program, states have broad discretion 
in choosing whether or not to provide financial support for religious activity. Thus, in programs 
involving public expenditures for services, a policy of equal access is constitutionally 
permissible, but not constitutionally mandatory. 
Unless the three principles are understood in a textured and interactive way, there are deep and 
ineradicable tensions among them. An unmodified principle of equal access seems at first glance 
to fully support the premise, central to the FBCI, that government grant programs should provide 
a level playing field for competition among religious and secular service providers. Moreover, an 
unadorned principle of beneficiary choice appears to suggest that the government may support 
social service with religious content to beneficiaries who voluntarily select that kind of service, 
so long as the government provides an adequate range of religious and secular options to 
beneficiaries. 
The no-indoctrination principle, however, constrains the scope of the equal access principle by 
prohibiting the government from directly financing programs that include explicitly religious 
content. Moreover, the no-indoctrination principle is not limited to cases of involuntary or 
coercive religious experience. Because the government may not directly pay to indoctrinate even 
those who freely seek such an experience, beneficiary choice programs must involve beneficiary 
control over the direction of funds as well as genuine choice among secular and religious service 
providers. 
Constitutionally appropriate administration of the FBCI thus depends in significant ways on (1) a 
nuanced appreciation of the three principles, (2) identification of areas of reconciliation among 
them, and (3) careful guidance to both government grantors and potential grantees about these 
cross-cutting constitutional parameters. 
REGULATORY REFORM AND THE IMPERFECT MESH 
WITH CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Among the very first official acts of President Bush were his two executive orders, issued 
January 29, 2001, designed to create an active administrative presence for the FBCI. These 
orders created WHOFBCI (E.O. 13,199) and the FBCI centers within each of the six major 
grant-making agencies of the federal government (E.O. 13,198). Both orders emphasized the 
principle of equal access by affirming the concepts of a level playing field and evenhandedness 
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among religious and secular organizations. Neither order explicitly referenced the constraint 
imposed by the no-indoctrination principle or the opportunities created by the beneficiary choice 
principle. One of the chief purposes of both orders was the elimination of “unnecessary 
legislative, regulatory, and other bureaucratic barriers that impede effective faith-based and other 
community efforts to solve social problems.” 
In 2001–2002, the main sticking point in the congressional deliberations on legislation related to 
the FBCI was the issue of religious selectivity in hiring by publicly supported religious entities 
(Farris, Nathan, & Wright, 2004). Many supporters of the FBCI wanted to reaffirm that such 
organizations would retain their current exemption, codified in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, from the prohibition on religious discrimination in employment. Others, including some 
who supported most of the FBCI principles, believed that faith-based entities should not be able 
to limit publicly financed jobs to members of their own faith. Still others feared that the FBCI 
would lead to violations of the no-indoctrination principle or that the mission of religious entities 
would be compromised if they accepted public funds. 
On December 12, 2002, the President acted unilaterally with an executive order entitled “Equal 
Protection of the Laws for Faith-Based and Community Organizations.” This order made the key 
principles of the FBCI applicable to all federal programs of social welfare funding.  
In 2003–2004, through the coordination of WHOFBCI and the FBCI agency centers, all of the 
major granting agencies promulgated a set of regulations designed to guide the participation of 
faith-based organizations in the grant-making process. These regulatory reforms (see the Table 
of Legal Materials in Appendix A) have achieved three substantial successes. First, the 
regulations have clarified that houses of worship and other entities with a strong religious 
identity are eligible to receive public grants as social welfare service providers. Prior to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Mitchell v. Helms (2000), which effectively eliminated the 
exclusion of pervasively sectarian entities from direct government funding, the eligibility of such 
organizations had been in doubt. These sets of regulations specify that participating 
organizations have a right to retain their religious character, including the display of religious 
icons, the selection of a governing board on a religious basis, and the inclusion of religious 
references in their mission statements. 
Second, the regulations provide that service beneficiaries have the right to be free from religious 
coercion or discrimination in federally financed activity. No prior U.S. statute or regulation 
prohibited federal grantees from engaging in discrimination against beneficiaries based on 
religious identity or on the beneficiaries’ willingness to participate in religious activity. This is a 
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very important development, although respect for these rights could be enhanced through an 
affirmative obligation of faith-based grantees to inform beneficiaries of the protections. HHS 
regulations for substance abuse treatment services provide an example of such a notice. 
Third, the regulations address the responsibility of all grantees with respect to the use of 
government funds to support religious activities. Nearly all federal agencies involved in the 
FBCI now have in place a regulation prohibiting the direct financing of “inherently religious 
activities, such as religious worship, instruction, or proselytization.” Grantees may engage in 
such activities only with private funds, and must separate those activities in time or place from 
activities directly funded by the government. These content restrictions have been reinforced by 
a variety of guidance documents and training materials developed by the WHOFBCI and federal 
agencies. 
The emphasis on the concept of “inherently religious activities,” however, may have produced an 
ambiguity in the regulatory environment. The concept of inherently religious activities is derived 
from Bowen v. Kendrick (1988) where the Court ruled that services related to adolescent 
sexuality were not “inherently religious” because such services could be performed with 
exclusively secular content. Thus, the FBCI’s ban on direct funding for inherently religious 
activities is accurate to a point because the no-indoctrination principle bars public support for 
worship, religious instruction, and proselytizing. But the regulations do not confront the question 
of whether social services that have explicitly religious content are precluded by the regulation. 
If understood too narrowly, the regulatory proscription on direct government financing of 
religious instruction significantly understates the no-indoctrination principle, which bars direct 
government financing of any activity with “specifically religious content” (Bowen v. Kendrick, 
1988). 
We believe the existing regulatory formula creates ambiguity with respect to direct funding of 
social services that have religious content. Some social services may be delivered using religious 
content, even if such content is not a necessary part of the service. For example, a grantee may 
teach the skills and behaviors necessary for success in the workplace, the value of marriage, the 
benefits of sexual abstinence outside of marriage, or the benefits of a drug-free lifestyle. The 
provision of these services may be in entirely secular terms or in terms that include explicitly 
religious language and beliefs. While it is possible that federal officials might provide sufficient 
warning and guidance, the regulations themselves do not warn grantors and grantees that the 
inclusion of specifically religious content in the delivery of such services may put the granting 
agency in conflict with the no-indoctrination principle and expose both the public grantor and the 
private grantee to legal consequences. 
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At times, federal agencies have provided appropriate explanation that the prohibition on direct 
funding of “religious instruction” includes social service materials that contain religious content. 
For example, earlier this year, the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) issued a 
memorandum to grantees under the Healthy Marriage Initiative. The memorandum explained 
that curricular materials must be “neutral with respect to religion,” and provided examples of 
curricula that would not qualify for direct government support because the materials included 
religious content. Another example of appropriate guidance can be found in the recent 
memorandum—issued by ACF in the wake of the settlement in ACLU of Massachusetts v. 
Leavitt—on the proper and improper ways to spend grant funds for programs that promote sexual 
abstinence by minors. 
An additional, though related, ambiguity may arise from the regulatory guarantee that faith-based 
organizations may receive grants and still retain their religious character. Even though the 
regulations define “religious character” in terms associated with organizational identity 
(acceptability of religious board members, maintenance of religious content in mission 
statement, etc), it is possible that organizations may misinterpret the guarantee as a 
representation that religious content in their government-financed services is acceptable if such 
content reflects the entity’s religious character. 
The ambiguity of the regulatory focus on “inherently religious activities” is especially 
problematic when applied to the direct funding of social services that aim at personal 
transformation. If faith-based social service agencies deliver food, shelter, or other material 
goods, it is usually not difficult for them to segregate those goods from religious activity and to 
ensure that government funds do not pay for the latter. In such a context, government funds can 
be used exclusively to support secular goods and services, and religious activity can be offered, 
as the federal regulations uniformly require, at a “separate time or place” not subsidized by 
government funds. In contrast, transformative services, such as those aimed at substance abuse, 
sexual abstinence among unmarried minors, and rehabilitation of those incarcerated for crime, 
may be much harder to segregate into secular and religious components. Most of the successful 
litigation (discussed below) against government-financed faith-based services has arisen in the 
context of transformative services. 
Uncertainty about the constitutionally acceptable use of direct grants also presents a difficult 
problem in the context of grants designed to build the capacity of faith-based organizations to 
provide social services. Such grants have been a central building block of the FBCI through the 
Compassion Capital Fund (CCF). Depending on the activities funded by the capacity-building 
grants, it can be difficult to segregate secular and religious activities. If a recipient of such grants 
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provides both religious and secular services, aid for building the organization’s capacity—
through computer technology, for example—is likely to benefit the organization’s religious 
programs as well as its secular programs, thus making the aid vulnerable to constitutional 
challenge. The one decided case on the subject upheld a capacity-building grant to a marriage-
strengthening program, but did so only in light of a specific finding that the grantee had removed 
the religious content from all the activities that benefited from federal support for the grantee’s 
capacity. (Christianson v. Leavitt, 2007). Thus, the public funding for capacity-building 
supported exclusively secular services.  
Moreover, CCF grants often involve private intermediaries empowered by the government to 
make subgrants. The Supreme Court has ruled that, like the government, these subgrantors are 
prohibited from directly subsidizing religious indoctrination (Bowen v. Kendrick, 1988). In the 
early years of the FBCI, the federal agencies may not have been sufficiently sensitive to the 
problems of necessary guidance for either intermediaries or subgrantees. The concern remains 
that the federal regulations have generally repeated the formula by which direct grants may not 
be used for inherently religious activities. 
An additional concern related to the current regulations is the existing legal requirement that the 
government monitor the content of government-financed social services provided by faith-based 
entities. The Supreme Court has ruled that such monitoring, which should not and need not be 
intrusive, is necessary to ensure compliance with the no-indoctrination principle; that is, to 
protect against unlawful diversion of public money to religious activity (Mitchell v. Helms, 2000; 
Agostini v. Felton, 1997). While the grantees are subject to the same federal or state monitoring 
imposed on any grantee, the current FBCI regulations prohibit the imposition of any requirement 
that faith-based organizations be treated differently than secular organizations for purposes of 
regulatory compliance. Although the emphasis on equal treatment is salutary, the regulations 
may not adequately highlight the government’s continuing constitutional obligation to provide 
particularized monitoring that focuses on the risk of diversion of public funds to religious 
activities. In a 2006 study of programs that provide funding for faith-based and community 
organizations, the Government Accountability Office found that federal agencies gave auditors 
little guidance in assessing whether grantees complied with restrictions on use of direct funds for 
religious activities (GAO, 2006). 
Even with respect to indirect funding, where constitutional restrictions are looser and room for 
inclusion of religious content correspondingly greater, federal programs could provide better 
regulatory language for government officials and faith-based grantees. Apart from regulations 
implementing statutory Charitable Choice provisions, regulations promulgated by the federal 
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agencies do not define indirect funding. Instead, the agency-wide FBCI regulations proscribe 
certain religious content in situations of direct funding and indicate that such a proscription does 
not apply to a program of indirect funding.  
Although this omission has not appeared to cause the same degree of uncertainty as the 
proscription on direct financing of inherently religious activities, potential grantors and grantees 
could benefit from specific regulations with respect to indirect funding. (Some agencies have 
developed detailed resources that provide clarity about the constitutional parameters of indirect 
funding. See for example the Department of Labor (2005) resource “Partnering with Integrity.”) 
The phrase “indirect funding” is drawn from the Cleveland school voucher decision (Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, 2002) and other Supreme Court cases involving policies that empower 
individual beneficiaries to select a religious entity as the provider of publicly supported services 
(Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 1993; Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Services for the Blind, 
1986). The Court’s decisions upholding such programs emphasized the ability of beneficiaries to 
make a “genuine and independent choice” among secular and religious alternatives. Thus far, the 
agency-wide FBCI regulations for implementing programs of beneficiary choice have only 
indicated that the programs must offer beneficiaries a choice to which the beneficiaries do not 
have religious objections. Those regulations have not taken the constitutionally mandated next 
step of requiring that voucher programs offer a religiously neutral menu of service providers, 
including a secular alternative.  
Moreover, federal regulations have not yet made clear the requirement that indirect aid must in 
some fashion pass through the control of the beneficiary, though not necessarily by the 
mechanism of vouchers or other tangible instruments (Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. 
v. McCallum, 2003). In other words, the concept of beneficiary choice means more than the 
simple fact of voluntary selection by beneficiaries among a number of providers. The regulations 
should state that the beneficiary must be empowered to designate the provider as a recipient of 
government funds and to stop the flow of those funds by withdrawing from that provider. 
In addition, the regulations might fruitfully sharpen the concept of beneficiary choice by greater 
attention to particular service contexts. What may constitute an adequate mechanism for choice 
when parents choose elementary or secondary schools (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002) may 
be insufficient when the relevant service involves people suffering from drug addiction, with 
accompanying impairment of cognitive capacity, or institutionalized foster care of minor 
children arranged by state officials (Teen Ranch, Inc. v. Udow, 2007). In cases of the latter type, 
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involving state officials rather than parents acting on behalf of minors, it may be that no one is 
competent to exercise beneficiary choice in favor of religious programming. 
Finally, despite substantial efforts to involve the states in the efforts associated with the FBCI, 
the regulatory analysis and communication of various legal doctrines of federalism could be 
improved for this initiative. For example, federal agencies have at times confusingly explained 
the relationship between federal law and state law, especially with respect to the highly 
controversial issue of religious selectivity in hiring by faith-based organizations. An exemption 
from federal restrictions on faith-based hiring does not automatically create an exemption for 
federal grantees from state law restrictions on faith-based hiring decisions. 
Moreover, the states themselves—even those with their own active faith-based and community 
initiatives—generally have not taken on the necessary task of supplying state-level regulatory 
content to granting agencies and potential grantees. To be successful at the state and local levels, 
the FBCI needs to include a legal and bureaucratic program designed to institutionalize its 
premises. Whether the cause is legal uncertainty or bureaucratic inertia, the states, which are the 
locus of most grant-making activity, have made virtually no progress in developing their own 
regulatory frameworks, even with respect to specific questions raised by state constitutional law. 
In some states, these state constitutional questions are substantial and include limits on the use of 
even indirect public aid for religious activity (Lupu & Tuttle, 2002). 
THE LITIGATION SURGE 
PRODUCED BY THE FBCI 
Concerns about regulatory precision and transparency are not merely academic. Since the 
inception of the FBCI, government funding of faith-based social services has generated a 
significant volume of litigation and there has been a considerable increase in the number of 
lawsuits and judicial decisions about publicly financed, faith-based social services in the past 
6 years. Most of these lawsuits have been initiated by public interest groups that are committed 
to strong principles of church-state separation (see the Table of FBCI-Related Litigation in 
Appendix B). Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. (FFRF) has been the most active 
instigator of this sort of litigation. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, the 
American Civil Liberties Union, the American Jewish Congress, and other groups have played a 
similar role.  
The Table of FBCI-Related Litigation lists all of the cases brought so far, categorized by 
outcome: Victories for Challengers to Government Action (7), Victories for Defenders of 
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Government Action (9), Settlements and other Terminations Before Decision (7), and Lawsuits 
Still Pending (2). These cases involve a wide variety of social services, including treatment for 
substance abuse, sexual abstinence for unmarried minors, work training, prisoner rehabilitation, 
mentoring the children of prisoners, education in pastoral care for nurses, custodial foster care 
for troubled teenagers, chaplaincies for public employees and patients in public hospitals, and the 
provision of shelter for the homeless. In a few of these cases early in the FBCI, the evidence 
suggested that the grantee had received inadequate guidance, which led to settlements in favor of 
the challengers or judicial rulings against the government (see, for example, FFRF v. Montana 
Office of Rural Health, 2004; ACLU of Massachusetts v. Leavitt, 2006). 
An elaborate body of law has now developed on the subject of partnerships between government 
and faith-based organizations in the delivery of social services, although few lawyers are aware 
of this as a defined field. Most of the victories and favorable settlements for the challengers to 
government action and several of the government victories as well (Teen Ranch v. Udow, 2007; 
Christianson v. Leavitt, 2007) have involved a strong invocation of the no-indoctrination 
principle. If grantees use direct government support to finance the interweaving of religious 
themes with social services, they invite successful lawsuits against the grantor and themselves. 
All lower court decisions have upheld the importance of this prohibition on government-financed 
indoctrination. In sharp contrast, the government has typically prevailed in suits asserting other 
kinds of claims, such as unsuccessful allegations of unlawful preference for religious over 
secular entities (FFRF v. Towey, 2005), unlawful religious discrimination in hiring (Lown v. 
Salvation Army, 2005), or improper structures of indirect financing (FFRF v. McCallum, 2003; 
American Jewish Congress v. Corporation for National and Community Service, 2005). 
In June 2007, the Supreme Court decided an important case that challenged the general policies 
of the FBCI rather than specific grants made under it. In Hein v. Freedom from Religion 
Foundation, Inc., the Court ruled that federal taxpayers lacked standing to complain about the 
constitutionality of discretionary expenditures made by federal executive agencies to promote the 
FBCI. The Hein ruling rests on a distinction between legislative decisions to make expenditures 
explicitly in support of religious causes or entities and discretionary executive decisions to spend 
in service of these same ends. Taxpayers may now challenge in the federal courts only spending 
decisions that have been explicitly authorized by legislatures. The Hein decision may well slow 
the pace of challenges to particular grants under the FBCI because some of these grants are not 
made pursuant to explicit legislative authority; however, Hein will not eliminate such challenges 
(Lupu & Tuttle, 2008).  
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IMPLICATIONS 
The FBCI resides in a constitutional and regulatory milieu that requires detailed regulations and 
careful guidance to be provided to grantors and grantees. Federal agencies have made some 
progress in this regard, but more needs to be done. This analysis leads to a number of 
recommendations that may facilitate a more administratively successful integration of the FBCI 
with the present contours of the relevant law: 
1. The regulations should be revised to clarify the full scope of the prohibition on direct 
funding of activity that has explicitly religious content. Such clarification will be 
most useful if it specifically identifies situations, such as faith-intensive treatment 
programs for substance abuse, in which grantees are likely to run afoul of the no-
indoctrination principle. 
2. Federal agencies should expand their regulatory concern to indirect financing, with 
particular attention to the adequacy of secular alternatives and the precise 
mechanisms of beneficiary choice. 
3. Federal agencies should provide greater clarity about the relationship between federal 
and state law, especially regarding the preemptive (or nonpreemptive) effect of 
exemption from federal policies of nondiscrimination in employment. 
4. Federal agencies should impose a constitutionally sensitive system of monitoring to 
ensure that grantees do not divert funds to religious activities. 
5. Federal agencies should continue to provide improved guidance for private 
intermediaries, especially with respect to capacity-building grants. 
6. Federal agencies should continue to make the protections for beneficiaries more 
robust, by requiring providers to inform beneficiaries that they have the right not to 
participate in religious activities and that their right to receive services does not 
depend on such participation.  
7. States and localities should continue to undertake efforts to educate grant officers and 
grantees, actual and prospective, concerning the relevant restrictions under both state 
and federal constitutional law. 
If these recommendations are implemented, it is likely that fewer lawsuits will be filed 
challenging grants to faith-based organizations, more grantors and grantees will be willing to 
participate actively in the FBCI, and the rights of beneficiaries will be fully protected. Under 
such conditions, the attractive promise of a level playing field for religious and secular 
organizations, and the rich involvement of both, can be realized in ways that are consistent with 
constitutional norms and traditions. 
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APPENDIX A: 
TABLE OF LEGAL MATERIALS 
Legislative and Regulatory Materials 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Pub. L.. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 
2105 (codified as amended in various sections of 42 U.S.C., including 42 U.S.C. sec. 604a et 
seq. (1996) 
Exec. Order 13,198, 3 C.F.R. 750 (2002) 
Exec. Order 13,199, 3 C.F.R. 752 (2002) 
Exec. Order 13,279, 3 C.F.R. 258 (2003) 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Equal Opportunity for Religious Organizations, 7 C.F.R. Part 
16 (2004) 
U.S. Department of Education, Participation in Education Department Programs by Religious 
Organizations; Providing for Equal Treatment of all Education Program Participants, 34 C.F. 
R. Parts 74, 75, 76, and 80 (2004) 
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Participation in Department of Health & Human 
Services Programs by Religious Organizations; Providing for Equal Treatment of all 
Department of Health & Human Services Program Participants, 45 C.F.R. Parts 74, 87, 92, and 
96 (2004) 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Equal Participation of Treatment for 
Faith-Based Organizations, 24 C.F.R. Parts 5 and 570 (2004) 
U.S. Agency for International Development, Participation by Religious Organizations in U.S. 
AID Programs, 22 C.F.R. Parts 202, 205, 211, and 226 (2004) 
U.S. Department of Justice, Equal Treatment for Faith-Based Organizations, 28 C.F.R. 38.1–
38.2 (2004) 
U.S. Department of Labor, Equal Treatment in Department of Labor Programs for Religious 
Organizations; Protection of Religious Liberty pf Department of Labor Social Service Providers 
and Beneficiaries, 29 C.F.R.2.2.32 (2004) 
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, VA Homeless Providers Grant and Per Diem Program; 
Religious Organizations, 38 C.F.R. Part 61 (2004) 
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Selected Administrative Resources 
Government Accountability Office, Faith-Based and Community Initiative: Improvements in 
Monitoring Grantees and Measuring Performance Could Enhance Accountability (2006) 
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Administration for Children & Families, Office 
of Family Assistance, “Curricular Use and Compliance with 45 CFR Part 87” (January 23, 2008) 
U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, “Training and 
Employment Guidance Letter 1-05” (July 6, 2005)  
White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, Guidance to Faith-Based and 
Community Organizations on Partnering with the Federal Government (2006) 
White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, Promoting Equal Treatment: A 
Guide for State & Local Compliance with Federal Regulations (2006) 
Decided Cases 
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) 
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) 
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) 
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F. 3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003)  
Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001) 
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) 
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) 
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) 
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) 
Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) 
278 
APPENDIX B: 
TABLE OF FBCI-RELATED LITIGATION 
Victories for Challengers to Government Action 
Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 509 F.3d 
406, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit, 2007 (affirming the invalidation of faith-based 
prison program, though reversing an order that Prison Fellowship Ministries repay the State of 
Iowa for unconstitutional programming) 
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v. Blanco, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 74590, U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, 2007 (invalidating earmarked grants, without 
specified purposes or safeguards against diversion to religious activities, to named houses of 
worship) 
Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 463 F.3d 1118, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Cir. 
2006 (affirming decision invalidating below-market lease from city to operator of homeless 
shelter because operator was engaged in religious indoctrination and sex discrimination) 
Bush v. Holmes, 919 S. 2d 392, Supreme Court of Florida, 2006 (invalidating, on state 
constitutional grounds, a voucher scheme for sending children to private schools, religious and 
secular) 
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Towey, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 39444, U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, 2005 (invalidating HHS grant to MentorKids USA 
because of religious content in the services provided) 
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Montana Office of Rural Health, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 29139, U.S. District Court for the District of Montana, 2004 (invalidating grants for the 
support of education in the practice of religion-based parish nursing) 
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum & Faith Works Milwaukee, 179 F. 
Supp.2d 950, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, 2002 (invalidating grant 
for the direct support of faith-based residential service for the treatment of substance-addicted 
welfare recipients) 
Victories for Defenders of Government Action 
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (dismissing taxpayer 
challenge to executive expenditures promoting the FBCI) 
Teen Ranch, Inc. v. Udow, 479 F.3d 403, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, 2007 
(affirming a decision upholding the exclusion from state assistance of faith-based residential 
service facility for teens with problems of substance abuse) 
Christianson v. Leavitt, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1237, Secretary of Health & Human Services, U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Washington, 2007 (dismissing suit against capacity-
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building grant by HHS to faith-based marriage support group, on the grounds that the grant 
supported only secular activity) 
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Nicholson, Secretary of the Department of Veterans’ 
Administration, 469 F. Supp. 2d 609, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, 
2007 (dismissing suit against hospital chaplaincy program of the Department of Veterans’ 
Administration) 
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Towey, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 39444, U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, 2005 (upholding, against claim of religious 
discrimination, subgrants from Emory University to faith-based health providers) 
Lown v. Salvation Army, Inc., & Commissioner, New York City Administration for Children’s 
Services, 393 F. Supp. 2d 223, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2005 
(dismissing claim that religious selectivity in employment, by publicly supported Salvation 
Army, violated federal or state law) 
American Jewish Congress v. Corporation for National and Community Service, 399 F.3d 351, 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir., 2005 (rejecting constitutional challenge 
to system of indirect public financing for training of teachers placed at religious schools in 
AmeriCorps program) 
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880, U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the 7th Cir. 2003 (rejecting constitutional challenge to indirect payment for placement of drug 
offenders at faith-based residential treatment center for substance abuse) 
American Jewish Congress v. Bost, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, 2002 
(refusing to order restitution of public funds by operator of faith-based jobs program that had 
unlawfully used public monies for support of religious activity) 
Settlements and other Terminations Before Decision 
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Mitchell Roob, U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Indiana, 2007 (withdrawal of suit after state terminated the employment of a chaplain 
hired to minister to employees of state social service department) 
Geneva College v. Chao, Secretary of Labor, U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, 2007 (suit alleging unlawful interference with college’s religious autonomy in 
hiring settled after state and federal authorities withdrew objection to college’s use of publicly 
supported employment search Web site) 
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Alberto Gonzales, U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Wisconsin, 2006 (withdrawal of suit after U.S. Department of Justice 
suspended its request for proposals to provide faith-based programming in federal prisons) 
American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts v. Leavitt, Secretary of Health & Human 
Services, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Massachusetts, 2006 (settlement of suit 
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against HHS for grant to “Silver Ring Thing,” a faith-based program promoting sexual 
abstinence among unmarried teens) 
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Minnesota Faith/Health Consortium, Alberto 
Gonzales, U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, 2005 (withdrawal of suit after 
University of Minnesota altered curriculum in its program on the relationship between faith and 
health) 
Bellmore v. Georgia Department of Human Resources & United Methodist Children’s Home, 
Georgia Superior Court, 2004 (settlement of employment discrimination suit in light of revision 
of state policy on religious discrimination in employment by state-supported faith-based 
organizations) 
American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana v. Foster, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13778, U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, 2002 (preliminary injunction, followed by 
settlement of suit against Governor of Louisiana with respect to program of state support for 
faith-based programs promoting sexual abstinence among unmarried teens) 
Lawsuits Still Pending 
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Bjergaard & Dakota Boys and Girls Ranch, U.S. 
District Court for the District of North Dakota, 2007 (suit alleging unlawful state support for 
religion in faith-based group foster home) 
Laskowski v. University of Notre Dame & Spellings, U.S. Secretary of Education, U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 7th Circuit, appeal pending, 2008 (suit alleging unlawful subgrants of public 
monies by University of Notre Dame to religiously affiliated colleges in federal program of 
teacher training)  
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